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THE ADVISORY OPINION-AN ANALYSIS*
OLiVER P. FiELDFrom the beginning of our constitutional history some
agency has been exercising the power to tell legislative bodies
that they were or were not acting within their power. For
a time it was an external agency, the Privy Council. Later
the state and national courts took over the task. But even
during the period between the break from England and the
establishment of the new government under the Constitution
of 1787, Massachusetts provided, in its Constitution of 1780,
that its highest court could be called upon for its opinion
on the validity of proposed legislative action. Precedent for
this action was to be found in English history, though English
experience was of limited scope.1 It was not long before the
courts were to establish firmly their power to pass upon the
constitutionality of legislation, but the Massachusetts practice of having the courts responsible for answering questions
concerning validity before the passage of an act has not become general practice in the American system. Other states
have adopted the practice of advisory opinions; some of
them have retained it; others abandoned it. But the institution still persists in a small group of states, and a few of them
have used the practice for so long that it has become an
integral part of their governmental system.
This study has been made in an effort to answer the
question whether or not the advisory opinion is a procedure
which remedies the defects that have appeared in the operation of judicial review of legislation after it has been enacted
into law. In order to answer this question it has been
*

t
1.

The basic materials for this study were first gathered in connection with Works Projects Administration, Official Project No.
65-1-71-140, Sub-Project No. 6. This study has also been assisted
by grants-in-aid from the Graduate School Research Fund of
Indiana University, from the Committee on Grants-in-Aid of the
Social Science Research Council and the Graduate School of the
University of Minnesota. Verification and checking of the materials were done by Kenneth Knight and Hyman Soshnick, of the
Indiana Bar. Ellen-Anne Smith Lloyd, of the Indiana Bar, made
all the tables, computations, and lists used in this study.
A.B. 1919, St. Olaf College; M.A. 1924, University of Minnesota;
LL.B. 1927, Indiana University; S.J.D. 1928, Yale University.
Professor of Government, Indiana University.
This history may be found in the basic work on advisory opinions,
ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT

1-80 (1918).
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assumed that it is necessary not only to understand the basic
legal rules that have been evolved in the application of constitutional provisions authorizing the advisory opinion, but
to analyze the experience of the advisory opinion as well;
that is, how the advisory opinion has worked in practice in
the states here studied (Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, and South Dakota). There is no dearth of
literature on the first point,2 and no effort will be made
here to repeat and recanvass all of the historical and theoretical materials. These have been intensively and' competently
handled by Albert R. Ellingwood, in his Departmental Cooperation in State Government, and by the numerous authors
who have relied on his work and who have brought it down
to date. No author, however, has analyzed the experience of
the advisory opinion, and it is hoped that in this respect the
present study will be a contribution.
The legislative branch is the primary interest of this
study.3 But in some states the executive is also authorized
2.

3.

The literature on advisory opinions has been summarized and
cited by Clovis and Updegraff, Advisory Opinions, 13 IowA L. REv.
188 (1928).
See also Goodrich, The Nature of the Advisory
Opinions of the Permanent Court of International Justice, 32
AM. J. INT'L L. 738 (1938); Davison, The Constitutionality and
Utility of Advis.ry Opinions, 2 U. OF TORONTO L. J. (1938);
Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHIO
ST. L. J. 21 (1937).
This article is one of a series of studies by the author on the
practice of judicial review of unconstitutional legislation. For
preceding studies see Field, Unconstitutional Legislation by
Congress, 39 Am. POL. SCI. REV. 54 (1945); FIELD, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN TEN SELECTED STATES (Bureau of Govern-

ment Research, Department of Government, Indiana University,
1943); Field, Unconstitutional Legislation in Indiana, 17 IND.
L. J. 101 (1941); Field, Effect of an Unconstitutional Statute, 1
IND. L. J. 1 (1926).
For purposes of comparison with the material on judicial
review of legislation this study has been confined to the same
period as the preceding studies, 1781-1937. No attempt has been
made to project the study into the more recent period of judicial
review in which somewhat different attitudes and factors have
characterized the use by courts of their power to declare laws
unconstitutional.
The analyses of advisory opinion procedure have been related
wherever possible to the same questions or topics that were used
in analyzing the experience of selected states in the field of
judicial review of legislation, and with some exceptions, the
same states were included. The analyses do not include all of the
states that have used the advisory opinion practice; one state
has been added to the list used in the studies on unconstitutional
legislation, namely, Maine.
The procedure followed in gathering the advisory opinions
was to leaf through each volume of the reports of the appellate
courts of the five states under review here. The list thus corn-
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to request opinions, and materials relating to executive requests have been included as an integral part of the data
on advisory opinions. Following an analysis of the data a
brief sketch of the major legal rules that have been applied
in administering the advisory opinion will be attempted. In
conclusion, some 'appraisal of the suitability of the advisory
opinion as a substitute for judicial review will be made.

THE DATA:

THE ADVISORY OPINION IN PRACTICE 4

Incidence in Time.

A chronology of the opinions rend-

ered from the inception of the practice in each of the states
studied may be helpful in assisting the reader to obtain an
idea of the frequency with which opinions have been requested. This list includes requests by both executive and
legislative branches.

(Table I, Page 223)

Advisory opinions are given on pending legislation or on
contemplated action by the executive, while decisions are on
acts passed or actions taken earlier, sometimes much earlier.
It is thus not possible to compare the number of decisions
in a state holding statutes unconstitutional in a certain
decade with the advisory opinions in that state during a
similar decade or period. But it is apparent that the advisory opinion, so far as its historical incidence is concerned,
has not diminished in use. On the contrary, it was utilized
to a greater extent after 1900 than in earlier years. It is
of course clear, also, that when controversies arise out of
piled was checked against the index of each volume and also
against annotated constitutions wherever they were available.
Over two million pages were examined in the course of the project of which this article is a part. The following search guide
was used in analyzing each opinion: (1) Citation (2) Date of
request (3) Date of opinion (4) To whom is the request for the
opinion- addressed? (5) Who makes the request? (6) Who signs
the request? (7) How many questions are submitted? (8) What
are the questions? (9) Are any facts stated separately? (10) Do
the requests raise constitutional questions? (11) Do the requests
raise questions of statutory power? (12) What are the answers
to the requests? (13) How often does Shepard's Citator say this
opinion has been cited? (14) Has the opinion been overruled?
(15) Is there any evidence of a formal argument by counsel before the court? (16) Has any statute been enacted in the state
like the one involved in the request after the advisory opinion?
(17) Are there any dissenting opinions? If so, how many pages
long? (18) How many judges dissent? (19) How long is the
majority opinion?
4. The purpose of this section is to present the data on the operation
of advisory opinions to furnish the basis for later generalization
and appraisal.
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the social, economic, governmental, or other situations in a
state, they tend to elicit increased numbers of requests and
opinions, just as they tend to give rise to lawsuits in the
courts.
Taking the gross number of requests and opinions before
and after 1900, slightly more than half came before that
year. (Table II, Page 224) Colorado presents a somewhat
different picture than these figures indicate, with 80 per
cent of its cases prior to 1900. This is of interest because
it began its use of the practice much later than the other
states studied. Although one of the five states, South Dakota,
permits only the executive to make the request, the tables
show that the legislature requested more opinions than the
executive. Legislatures requested 65.4 per cent, while the
executive requested 34.6 per cent of the total.5
(Table II,
Page 224)
The chronological distribution of judicial decisions in a
study of ten selected states indicates that 43 per cent came
before 1900, and 57 per -cent after that year.6 The study
of unconstitutional federal legislation indicates that 44 per
cent of those cases came before and 56 per cent after 1900."
No attempt is made to generalize from the slight difference
between the advisory opinion and the judicial decision experience.
Time Elapsing Between Request and Opinion. One of
the most glaring defects in the operation of judicial review
of legislation has been the length of time elapsing between
the enactment of a statute and the judicial determination of
its validity. In some instances many years, even scores of
years, have passed before a statute has been involved in litigation, and, therefore, has been the subject of controversy
suitable to judicial settlement under our procedural system.
One of the greatest apparent advantages of advisory opinion
practice has always been thought to be the speed with which
it could operate.
How long a time elapses between request and opinion?"
5.

The literature suggests that many persons have probably been
unaware of the fact that the executive makes as much use of the
advisory opinion as this set of figures indicates. See note 2 supra.

6.

FIELD, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN TEN SELECTED STATES

7.

Field, Unconstitutional Legislation by Congress, 39 Am. POL. SCI.
REV. 54, 56 (1945).

8.

Colorado records published in the regular reports do not show

13 (1943).
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South Dakota had an average period elapsing between request and opinion of 7.4 days, which is unusually short. The
South Dakota figures are for the executive alone, of course,
because of the restricted practice of that state. The highest
average of time elapsing is 45.4 days, for legislative requests
in New Hampshire. 9
The average elapsed time for all states included in this
study is 29.8 days. When this is compared with the experience in judicial review of legislation by regular procedures,
the contrast is most striking. In ten selected states the
average period elapsing between the time that statutes were
enacted and the time when the decisions were handed down
was seven years and six months.'0 Congressional statutes
had been on the books, on an average, ten years before they
were declared invalid."
The length of time between the commencement of litigation by parties and the termination of litigation on appeal
to the highest court of a jurisdiction has not been the subject
of statistical analysis, because the data are not readily available in the printed records. For those cases in which data
were available, a conclusion is justified that a much longer
period elapsed between commencement and termination of
regular judicially settled controversies than elapsed in the
case of the advisory opinions in the states included here. In
fact, an advisory opinion is obtained in less time than most
cases are settled by the court of first instance. When to
this is added the months, and sometimes years, involved in
appeal to intermediate and ultimate appellate courts, the difference in time consumed is very great. There can be no
question that the advisory opinion has a great advantage over
12
regular judicial procedure so far as time is concerned.
dates, and it was not believed worthwhile to go to the expense of
gathering this material, in view of the fact that sufficient other
ata were available to furnish a sound basis for judgment on this
question.
9. It might be observed that the New Hampshire court is not in
session at the capital at all times even during the winter. Rarely
is the docket sufficiently crowded to justify continuous session.
Some of the judges maintain their residences in their former
homes outside the capital, coming to the capital only during the
term of court. Thus a longer tune might be expected to elapse
between request and opinion in that state than in some others.
10. FIELD, op. cit. s p'ra note 6, at 45.
11.

Field, supra note 7, at 58.

12. This problem of time consumed in litigation must be related to
the problem of the adequacy of briefs and argument in the two
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Parties to the Requests for Opinions. The parties to
constitutional litigation are a source of never ending interest to students of law and politics. The parties involved in
advisory opinion procedure are, of course, in many instances,
in reality the same as those in private litigation. But instead of there being counsel representing a municipality, or a
private corporation, or a group of sportsmen interested in
conservation of fish and game, or former servicemen interested in governmental subsidies, these interests are represented by members of the lower house, or of the senate.
These representatives, in turn, influence committees or the
houses to make formal requests. But on the record the requesting party is always formal, -and must be the party
authorized by the constitutional provision on advisory opinions to make requests for opinions. Similarly, the requests
must be to the agency specified.
In states in which the governor, or the governor and
council, is authorized to make requests, the governor himself
usually signs the requests. But, in some instances, as in
Maine, the printed request does not bear the governor's signature. It is often true in New Hampshire that the secretary
of state signs with the governor.
With respect to requests from the houses of the legislative body, there is no indication as to who makes the request
for the New Hampshire house. In Colorado, requests are
signed by the secretary of state, or the secretary of the
senate, or the president of the senate. In Maine, they have
been signed by the speaker of the house, clerk of the house,
secretary of the house, president pro tem of the senate, chairman (apparently referring to a request originated by a committee of the house or senate) and "President of the Senate,
Acting as Governor." Massachusetts requests have been
signed by the president of the senate and by the speaker of
the house.
Body to Whom Requests are Addressed. Requests
should, of course, be addressed to the body specified in the
constitution as a suitable body to receive them. This would
seem to be a simple requirement, but in practice it has given
rise to both practical and theoretical difficulties. In Colotypes of procedures, but consideration of this point will be deferred until a general appraisal of merits and demerits of the
advisory opinion is attempted.
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rado, for example, requests have been addressed to the "Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court," if the governor made
the request, but to the "Supreme Court," if the legislative
body made the request. Both the institutional and personal
addresses have been used by the governor of Maine in making his requests. The chief executive in Maine has also addressed some requests to "The Chief Justice of the Supreme
Judicial Court," apparently intending this as a designation
of the officer who is to transmit the request to the members
of the court itself. Legislative requests in Maine have been
addressed to "Justices of the Supreme Court," and "Justices
of the Supreme Judicial Court." 13
Executive requests in Massachusetts have been addressed to the "Honorable Justices of the Supreme Judicial
Court," while legislative requests have been addressed to
"Justices of the Supreme Court," or "Justices of the Supreme
Judicial Court," as the case may be. In Massachusetts it is
the "justices" who are to be addressed, under the constitutional provision. In New Hampshire most requests have
been addressed to the "justices" as the constitution specifies,
but a few have been addressed to the "Supreme Court,"
which is a deviation from the constitutional requirement.
South Dakota practice is uniform, and all requests have been
addressed to the "Honorable Judges of the Supreme Court,"
as the constitution recites.
Drafting the Requests. The preparation of requests for
advisory opinions is not always handled by the same officers
as those who make the requests. In Massachusetts, for instance, each house has a regular officer whose duty it is to
prepare these requests, in addition to assisting committees
and officers on legal problems involving technical refinements.1 4 It is clear to any close observer that the role of this
officer in the process of legislation in the General Court of
Massachusetts is a very important one, and much credit
for the excellent form in which requests are prepared in
Massachusetts should go to this officer. He is not *only
effective in assisting the members in confining their requests
13. For discussion of the implications of these provisions see page infra.
14. The phrase "Legislative Counsel" has several different meanings
in state government, generally, but in Massachusetts it refers to
the technical legal adviser to the House of Representatives. The
Senate similarly has an officer of this type, but with a different
title.
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to questions that are susceptible of intelligent and definitive
answers, but also in restricting the inquiry to matters that
are within the purview of pending legislation. Where individual members of committees draft the requests, of course,
varying degrees of skill are brought to the task.
Not infrequently, the attorney general is asked to give
technical assistance in drafting requests. Sometimes these
requests are prepared with skill and consideration. However, in many instances some minor employee in his office
may actually perform the task of drafting.
Subjects of Requests. On what subjects do executives
and legislators ask for advice from the justices of the highest court? 15 The statutes concerning which advisory opinions have been requested are not identical with those of
statutes which have been involved in litigation, and which
have been declared invalid, 1 6 and for this reason a true comparison of the two cannot be made. The categories which
best seemed to fit the subjects of advisory opinion requests
are as follows: (1) taxation and governmental finance; (2)
governmental structure; (3) regulation of business; (4)
voting and elections; (5) police power regulations; (6) highways; (7) local government and schools; (8) legislative procedure and statutory construction; (9) social security and
compensation payments; (10) property rights and interests
-eminent domain.
(The materials on this phase of the
analysis are presented in Table III, Page 225)
Thus the advisory opinions in the states included in this
study dealt with questions of inter-governmental relations,
15.

Requests

vary in their complexity.

While

some may pose

a

single question, other requests are very complicated, and deal
with many related aspects of a central issue. Still others are
diffuse in that they ask for opinions on unrelated subjects, all of
which are pending before the house, or before a committee. In
this section, each question on each subject has
as a separate question, or request, so far as the
subjects is concerned. The average number of
in each request was:
By Governor
By

16.

Colorado
Maine
Massachusetts
New Hampshire

2.54
3.19
3.14
2.16

South Dakota

1.86

been considered
classification of
questions asked
Legislature
1.65
3.61
3.14
2.10

(Legislature
makes no

requests)
The subject matter categories used in the study of those statutes
were: (1) government (2) courts (3) taxes (4) business (5)
property (6) labor. See FIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 19.
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structure of government, taxation and finance, and other
phases of public policy, rather than with questions or issues
directly related to police, property rights, or personal liberties. These are the subjects which were also found to be involved in controversy in litigation resulting in declarations
of unconstitutionality17 But in the advisory opinions questions dealing with the structure of government were proportionately greater than in the statutes involved in constitutional litigation in the courts. This, of course, is what one
might expect. It is somewhat interesting, nevertheless, to
find such a preponderance of the topics presented by these
requests being so remotely related to private and personal
rights. It should be noted, of course, that many legislative
proposals in the field of governmental structure do affect
in an indirect manner the rights of individuals. Advisory
opinions, then, are not to be justified or condemned on the
ground that they protect or fail to protect individual rights,
as that term is used in ordinary language. The procedure
must be justified primarily from the point of view of its
effectiveness in dealing with proposals which affect governmental policies in their broader signification.
Length of Opinions. The average length of the advisory
opinion is four pages. The opinions to the Colorado legislature average two pages in length, while Maine replies to the
legislature, the longest, average five pages in length. 18 Fivepages was the lowest median length of judicial opinions for
any state included in the study of ten selected states, 19 while
United States Supreme Court opinions in cases involving unconstitutional legislation average thirteen and one-half pages
20

in length.

Frequency with which Opinions Sustain or Deny Power.
The advisory opinion procedure is used to test both the
17. Ibid.

18. Average number of pages of majority opinions:
Requests by Governor
Requests by
Legislature
Colorado
4.34
2.08
Maine
4.43
5.08
Massachusetts
3.47
4.88
New Hampshire
3.12
4.59
South Dakota
4.32
(Legislature
makes no
requests)
19. FIELD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 70.
20. Field, supra note 7, at 60.
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statutory and the constitutional power of the requesting
party. Data are presented concerning executive requests
relating to statutory power and executive and legislative requests relating to constitutional power. Further data reveal
that courts rendering advisory opinions are more likely than
in regular litigation to hold that governmental agencies do
not have the constitutional power to take proposed action.
In sixteen requests from the governor of Maine, six
replies held that he had the power to act under the statute
in question, and ten opinions held that he was without power.
Three opinions by the Massachusetts justices gave the governor power, while in five they said that he had not been
granted power. Six New Hampshire opinions denied the
governor the power to act under statutes, and one advised
him that he could proceed under existing statutory provisions.
With respect to requests for interpretation of constitutional provisions restricting legislative power or capacity to
enact legislation, the Massachusetts justices replied in fortynine opinions that no power existed, while in forty-eight
opinions the legislature was said to possess the capacity to
act in the manner proposed. Almost as equally divided were
the opinions to the governor, four saying that the governor
had constitutional power, while six said that he had no
power to act. In Maine, twenty-one legislative requests
brought replies advising that power existed, and seventeen
said that no power existed. Fourteen executive requests resulted in judicial advice sustaining proposed executive power,
and fifteen denied the executive power. New Hampshire
opinions gave twenty-one approvals and twenty-five disapprovals of proposed constitutional action by the legislative
agencies. All three opinions to the executive denied him constitutional authority in the situations therein described. The
South Dakota executive sometimes asks for advice on whether
or not the legislature has constitutional power to act, and
thirteen opinions said that it had power, while three said
that it did not have power. Two opinions gave the governor
constitutional authority to act. Colorado experience shows
thirty-four opinions favored power, while twenty-four denied
power to the legislature. In two instances the governor received opinions advising that he had constitutional authority.
These figures show a striking contrast between the
operation of judicial review in its normal procedures, and
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the operation of the advisory opinion. Not more than one
in six or seven cases coming before the courts which challenge the constitutionality of legislation actually results in
a declaration of invalidity.21 In advisory opinions a much
greater proportion than this is held to be invalid. There
can be little room for argument on this point. The advisory
opinion restricts the legislature more than the regular operation of judicial review does. But, to counterbalance this
factor, it should be pointed out that in some instances the
advisory opinion warns the legislature that a proposed action
will be invalid, and as a result, other valid action can be
taken. A bill will be altered, sometimes in such a manner
22
that its effectiveness is not impaired, and rendered valid.
Even when allowance is made for this situation, it must be
clear that the experience represented by this body of advisory opinions clearly shows that advisory opinions are not
to be adopted as a technique for hastening radical reform.
The conservative effects of the advisory opinion are only
what one might expect. Private individuals are not usually
directly affected in any adverse manner by the declaration.
The entire proceeding is such that no real hesitancy need
be felt in expressing doubt as to the existence of power. Nor
does it mean that no action can be taken; but even if action
cannot be taken, the alternative of constitutional amendment
exists in most instances.
Advisory Nature of Opinions. One of the points constantly stressed in discussions of the advisory opinion is
that the opinion is by justices, not by courts. Several state
constitutions specifically mention "justices," but the Colorado provision mentions "Supreme Court." These provisions
21.
22.

FIELD, op..cit. supra note 6, at 12.
However, justices rarely give any advice to legislatures on how to

proceed to correct proposed bills to make them consistent with
the constitution.

The justices restrict themselves to the questions

asked of them, and offer no "free" advice. They usually answer

requests, but eighteen instances were found in which the requests
were not answered by opinions, the justices expressly declining
to give opinions. An examination of subjects dealt with in these
opinions is of little assistance in determining hidden motives on
the part of the justices. Sometimes the justices feel that the request is so-vague that they cannot adequately formulate a reply.
In other instances, they seem to feel that the request is primarily
a political or partisan request. On other occasions, the court

has declined because it would not attempt the settlement of

private rights except in regular litigation. It may be that the
court feels, also, that the legislation is not really "pending legislation."

214
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are a clue to the nature of the advisory opinion. It is an
opinion by the judges, given for the purpose of advising, not
for the purpose of determining. For this reason, a legislator
may be quite within his province when he votes for a bill
that has been advised against by the justices on constitutional
grounds. The legislator is entitled to regard constitutionality
on a par with other factors going to the merits of the bill,
as he sees them. His function is not primarily to be a judge,
but to be a formulator of policy. He may be quite within
the proper sphere of his function if he assumes that either
the rules have not been firmly settled, or that the conditions
have changed so much that the judges will, when confronted
with a regular judicial proceeding, change their minds and
adopt a different line of reasoning based on a different set
of assumptions. If the advisory opinion were rendered by
a court, as an institution, distinguishable from the persons
who compose it, as are cases in a judicial proceeding, then
it could be argued that the legislator would be bound on
the constitutional point.
This reasoning applies with equal force to the governor.
In some instances the chief executive may find it necessary
to use his own judgment, particularly when one of the justices has disagreed with his brethren. The usual situation,
of course, is that governors and senates and houses of representatives give serious weight to opinions, and customarily
follow them in their subsequent work on the problems dealt
with in the requests and opinions.
Role of Counsel in Advisory Opinion Procedure. One of
the most severe criticisms of the advisory opinion practice
has always been that in contrast to regular judicial cases,
no argument of counsel is provided for, and that the courts,
therefore, are without benefit of argument of opposing counsel. This has been alleged to be serious, not only because
it deprives the court of the benefit of counsel, but also because it deprives the parties, or interested groups, of adequate presentation of the different phases of the argument
in support of their contentions or views. The experience on
this point is quite at variance with popular, or even expert,
opinion. Argument has taken place by brief in twenty-one
instances in Colorado, two in Massachusetts, and in thirteen
instances in New Hampshire. However, no evidence has been
found of oral argument. There is nothing in the constitutions of the states involved to prevent the courts, or the
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justices, from serving notice to interested groups in the
legislature that they may file briefs if they wish to do so.
The time permitted for the preparation of briefs may be
relatively short. However, this need not be an insuperable
handicap, because in most of these instances the interested
parties have already done much of the basic research required.
Dissents. The distinction between justices and the court
of which they are members has given rise to some thorny
problems in advisory opinion practice. Do judges dissent
from the "majority" of the court in advisory opinions? They
should be free to dissent from the views of their brethren,
but not from a "majority" opinion. Opinions have been
3
written by the individual members only on rare occasions.2
More often, the chief justice, or some other designated justice, has prepared the opinion after the usual consultation
or conference of all the members of the court. If one or two
members dissent they may merely note the fact or choose to
write a dissenting opinion, as is customary in judicial opinion
writing. The tendency to handle advisory opinion requests
in the same manner as regular cases, so far as internal court
procedure is concerned, is natural, and does not conclusively
show whether in essence the work is judicial or advisory.
But it does show that as a matter of practical routine the
judges think of it as relatively normal judicial work. On
the other hand, their repeated assertions that the opinions
are individual, not institutional, should be taken at face
value. There is a distinction, and this distinction has important practical results in restricting the use of the opinion
as a procedure for handling constitutional questions.
Comparing dissents in regular judicial work with dissents in advisory opinion work, the figures show that 8 per
cent of the advisory opinions contained dissents, while 16
per cent of judicial decisions contained dissents.24 Approximately 50 per cent of United States Supreme Court decisions
dealing with unconstitutional congressional acts were divided. 25 Bare majority opinions are not usual, only 1.6 per
23. Maine opinions contain fifteen dissents; ten dissents were found
in Massachusetts opinions; Colorado replies contain six dissents;
New Hampshire opinions contain four dissents; and in South
Dakota no dissents were found.
24. FiELD, op. cit. supra note 6, at 59 et seq.
25. Field, supra note 7, at 59 et seq.
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cent of all advisory opinions dividing in this way. State supreme court decisions were agreed to by a bare majority in
5.5 per cent of the cases, while in Supreme Court decisions
concerning invalid congressional statutes, 13 per cent were
26
agreed to by a bare majority.
It is not surprising that there are more dissents in regular judicial than in advisory work. The lack of oral argument, and in most instances, of any argument, by counsel,
the absence of private parties to be directly affected, and
the lack of responsibility of establishing precedent, all combine to make dissent less likely in advisory opinions than
in regular decisions. Also, cases of personal liberty are absent from normal advisory opinion work, and this partly
explains the divergency.
The subjects involved in opinions in which there were
differences of views expressed by the justices shed little
light on the causes for these differences. The distribution
of the subjects in divided advisory opinions seems to be
about the same as in decisions, and much the same as in
opinions in which there was unanimous agreement.
Use as Precedent. Advisory opinions are used as precedents by the bar, by the courts, and by the public. They are
cited in briefs, in opinions by the courts, and despite the
fact that they are sometimes carefully distinguished from
judicial decisions, they are relied on as fully as decisions
are, so far as precedent is concerned. 27 For instance, Massachusetts advisory opinions to the legislature have each been
cited on an average of fourteen times by the courts. According to Shepard's Citator, the advisory opinions from the five
states here studied have been cited on an average of six
times each.
JUDICIAL DECISIONS INTERPRETING ADVISORY

OPINION PROVISIONS
Part of the experience with advisory opinion practice is
doctrinal in character. Judicial decisions construe the sections of a constitution authorizing the justices or the court
26.
27.

See notes 24, 25 supra.
In conversations with lawyers and judges this author found that
they professionally made use of advisory opinions and decisions
indiscriminately, and only as an afterthought would they add:

"Of course, they are not like decisions,"

19491

THE ADVISORY OPINION-AN ANALYSIS

to give advice on request. Rules and principles are generalized from, as well as assumed prior to, opinions in particular instances. These rules or principles are data despite
the fact that they are doctrinal. It is important to learn
what rules the courts have formulated as they have worked
with the practice of giving advice in the form of opinions.
Professor Ellingwood has summarized the major rules
and principles that have been281evolved by the courts in their
work with advisory opinions.
Not all of the thirteen rules stated by Professor Ellingwood are of equal interest to one who is attempting to appraise the advisory opinion in terms of its possible utility
as a procedure for supplementing existing methods of judicial review, or as a substitute for regular judicial review of
executive or legislative action. Of particular interest here
are certain of his generalizations:
2. Advisory opinions will not be rendered when the question submitted deals with private rights involved in a case
actually before the courts....
3. The possibility that the question submitted may at
some time come before the courts in a litigated case is not a
sufficient excuse for refusing to give an advisory opinion
thereon....
(a) Ex parte advisory opinions upon questions
of private right should not be given;
(b) Questions of private right should only be
adjudicated in regular proceedings in court;
(c) No advisory' opinions should be given in
advance of possible cases dealing with the questions
referred;
(d) Existing statutes should not be construed in
advisory opinions;
(e) Questions referred by the legislatures for
advisory opinions must be publici juris.

Probably the most important single rule listed by Professor Ellingwood is 3 (a), which is that the advisory opinion
will not be given in a situation which involves private rights.
Presumably, private rights are involved within the meaning
of the rule only when such rights are readily ascertainable,
and the parties to be affected can be easily identified. In
operation the rule restricts the use of advisory opinion to
28.

ELLINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERNMENT

178-237 (1918). His summary still accurately describes the legal
situation and should be studied with care by anyone who is
interested in advisory opinions.
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matters of general concern, such as problems of governmental power, or capacity, to lay down general standards or
rules, and with general problems of interpretation. At first
thought this might seem to unduly restrict the operation of
the advisory opinion, but it may be that this is a sound rule,
when all phases of the problem are considered.
It has often been argued that it is a weakness of the
advisory opinion that it is not used as, or suitable for use
as, a device for settling the application of statutes to specific
situations and to particular parties.2 0 The question of legislative power should probably not be conceived of in the latter
terms. It is a fair question whether or not a court should
pass upon constitutionality of statutes in terms of their
specific application in the process of administration. It
may well be that questions of legislative power ought to be
separated from questions of direct private injury in the application of the law. Legislative capacity to enact a statute,
that is, to formulate a standard or rule, is one problem; the
question whether or not in the application of the standard
some individual has been injured may be another. Obviously,
of course, a general statute which specifically authorized
bills of attainder would be invalid, but it would be invalid
because it violated a prohibition in the constitution, and this
prohibition forbids the formulation of rules authorizing this
procedure. A lack of legislative capacity is involved, and
this lack of power is not to be tested in terms of whether
X or Y or anyone else is being proceeded against. Not all
instances are as clear as this, but in the opinion of this writer
the principle that questions of legislative power to formulate
general rules should not be tested by the manner in which
the rules are enforced against individuals remains valid. The
claim that the particular facts of a particular case and that
the specific provision of a statute is applicable to the party
under these circumstances is a question of the administration
of justice, and should present a legal, but not a constitutional
problem. This is true, even where the guarantee of personal
29.

See FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS 24 (1939); Frankfurter,
A Note on Advisory Opinions. 37 HARv. L. REv. 1002 (1924).

Brandeis, J., in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.
S. 288, 346 n.4 (1936), has collected a number of cases in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has reiterated the long
established principle that the federal courts do not have the
power to give advisory opinions, since it is not considered an
incident of the judicial function to which Article III limits them.
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liberty is expressly recited in the constitution itself. There
should be some method of testing the question of power, irrespective of particular individuals or circumstances. It is
true that the Anglo-American legal mind instinctively resents this mode of legal reasoning, but that is no reason why
our conceptions cannot change, if the change will improve
our legal procedures.
Subdivision (d) of number 3 of Professor Ellingwood's
rules, to the effect that courts will refuse to pass on or interpret the provisions of existing statutes that have already
been enacted by the legislature, is a serious limitation on the
scope of the advisory opinion. This leaves the advisory
opinion restricted to the field of pending legislation, or in
the case of the executive, to proposed action. There is no
sound reason why justices cannot interpret a statute in an
advisory opinion as well as they can interpret it in a declaratory judgment, except that the concept of the advisory opinion is that it is for purposes of advising branches of the government in the performance of their functions, not for the
direct benefit of private individuals in the state. The declaratory judgment, however, is thought of as a procedure
for the benefit of private individuals primarily, probably because private parties are represented as such, and because
regular judicial procedures, including the use of counsel, are
followed. But just as the declaratory judgment can be used
to advise an officer of his powers, so the advisory opinion
could similarly be used whenever the legislature or governor
required this knowledge before taking some contemplated
action. The courts have ruled otherwise.
It is true that if the distinction between an opinion' by
the justices and an opinion by the court be observed, the
refusal to interpret a statute might be justified on the
ground that the advice is for purposes of a limited and specified character, and that the justices are not to take over the
advisory functions of the attorney general. This accounts
for the fact that in Colorado, where the court, not the justices, is specified as giving the opinion, the rule that advisory
opinions relating to existing legislation will not be rendered
is not wholly applicable30
Professor Ellingwood's second rule, that advisory opin30.

For confused state of the law of Colorado on the point see
ELLINGWOOD, Op. cit. supra note 28, at 197 et seq.
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ions will not be rendered where private rights involved are
already before a court for adjudication, is obviously sound.
But this is true, not primarily because it relates to private
rights, but because it relates to judicial administration and
the relation of higher to lower courts. It is advisable to
permit a court that is proceeding with a case to complete
it unless there is some overwhelming reason for doing otherwise.
AN APPRAISAL OF THE ADVISORY OPINION

Some basic changes would be required in the advisory
opinion practice if it were to be made a substitute for judicial review even in the cases in which regular judicial procedures assist the executive and legislative branches in the
exercise of their functions. The advisory opinion is not
without merit, and within the sphere of its advantages it
is helpful as an instrument for facilitating the work of the
legislature and the executive in their respective roles in the
lawmaking process.
It is not true that the advisory opinion is unsuited to
serve as an adequate substitute for judicial review merely
because argument and representation of affected parties has
not been fully utilized in advisory opinion procedure. Oral
as well as written argument could be used. Nor would it be
impossible to have counsel represent affected-prospectively
affected-groups, because notice could be given effectively
to such groups, and representation before the court could
be arranged. If advisory opinion procedure is unsuited for
judjcial work it is not for these reasons. The determining
factor is that the advisory opinion is conceived to be advisory in the process of making statutes rather than as a
device adaptable to -the settlement of rights affected by
enacted statutes. It is this, no doubt, that explains the unwillingness of courts to give advisory opinions of a declarative nature after a statute has been enacted, when private
parties may be involved.
The advisory opinion is useful to show what improvements might be made in the regular procedures of judicial
review of legislation, or executive action. For example, it
is striking that advisory opinions are so much shorter than
opinions in controverted cases. They are shorter, not because they do not involve private rights, because sometimes

19491

THE ADVISoRY OPINION-AN ANALYSIS

they do, nor because there is no argument, because sometimes there is. They are shorter because the judges do their
own work, and when expressing their conclusions have the
requests and issues more or less outlined for them by the
requesting agency. They are also under less temptation to
copy long extracts from briefs of counsel often containing
much irrelevant materials, and have every reason for expressing themselves pointedly and clearly within a brief
space and within a reasonable period of time. This may also
account for the infrequency with which advisory opinions
are overruled'1
For many years it has been a widespread complaint that
an unnecessarily long time is consumed in litigating a constitutional point. Another serious problem in this field is
the time that elapses between enactment of a statute and the
initiation of the lawsuit designed to test its validity. Not
only is the regular procedure that is suited to common law
trial unsuited to constitutional litigation in many instances,
but the long delays in appellate procedure are also serious
obstacles to a smooth functioning of judicial review. The
object of judicial review should be to determine effectively
the questions of power or of rights for all concerned (and
that includes the entire public) as soon as possible, consisfent
with adequate safeguards.
The advisory opinion has a great advantage over judicial review-with respect to the time element, for the advisory
opinion procedure operates when a device for testing the
validity of statutes is needed. Judicial review often operates
long after it is needed, and for practical purposes, sometimes
not at all. Dependent as judicial review is upon private
initiative in testing validity, and on common law tests of adequate interest, the ordinary process of judicial review is
seriously inadequate to serve the real needs of the public.
It is with respect to the needs of governmental bodies that
the advisory opinion has its use.
Despite this advantage on the part of the advisory opin31.

One significance of the length of opinions is that long opinions
almost invariably inject a factor of uncertainty into the law.
Anything that makes the work of determining the present state
of the law more uncertain with respect to any constitutional
point is to be deplored. Constitutional law is destined to be
sufficiently blessed with uncertainty for a long time to come,
without having unnecessary doubts thrust upon it by rambling
opinions.
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ion, it must be concluded that the advisory opinion practice,
even at its best, is a supplement to, not a substitute for, judicial review. The advisory opinion is not available to private
or corporate or group parties generally. It is restricted,
usually to the two houses of the legislature and the executive (or the executive and a council if there is one). Private
parties injured may not initiate a request under existing
constitutional provisions. Nor are advisory opinions binding
upon private parties. They are not for the purpose of determining rights affecting persons, but rather, they are primarily for the purpose of giving advice to public bodies. The
advisory opinion is designed for use during the process of
legislation, or in the process of executive action.
In the light of these factors the question arises whether
the advisory opinion procedure should be recommended to
states not now using it, or to the national government. The
answer must depend in part on what is to be done to judicial
review itself. If judicial review is to be improved and made
more effective, the answer might well be in the negative,
although the question would be debatable. If, on the other
hand, judicial review is to continue to operate with its
present and past procedural limitations, the answer might
well be that more jurisdictions ought to use the advisory
practice.
There can be little doubt that the advisory opinion has
worked with a reasonable degree of effectiveness in the
states in which it has been used. Just as a good common
law lawyer is always a little disturbed by the procedures
for "quieting title," bar and bench are, as a matter of form,
theoretically disquieted by the advisory opinion practice because of the common law assumptions requiring adversary
parties. Both legislators and lawyers seem agreed that the
advisory opinion is useful in the process of government. If
it is to be adopted by other states, the adoption should be
accompanied by some of the same institutional arrangements
used in a state like Massachusetts. For instance, a state
would be well advised to introduce a legislative counsel along
with the practice of advisory opinions.
States using the advisory opinion are conservative about
urging it on others. Their general attitude seems to be that
it is satisfactory for them, but as to others-well, they must
decide for themselves as to whether or not they can use it
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to advantage. It may well be that the practice would be unsuited to a community in which less social stability exists,
in which legal procedures are regarded as of little more importance than the rules of a political party committee, and
slight distinction is made between legislative and judicial
work.
The advisory opinion may be a useful instrument of
government as things now stand, but it would have a lesser
role to play if judicial review were improved to the point
where it could effectively operate as a public, as well as a
private, function in the legal order.

APPENDIX
TABLE I
CHRONOLOGICAL DISTRIBUTION

Colorado
1780-89
1790-99
1800-09
1810-19
1820-29
1830-39
1840-49
1850-59
1860-69
1870-79
1880-89
1890-99
1900-09
1910-19
1920-29
1930-39
TOTAL

OF

Massachusetts

ADvIsoRy

Maine

OPINIONs-BY DECADES*

New
Hampshire

South
Dakota

Total

33
51
4
9
1
7

3
1
1
3
2
6
8
8
3
10
8
11
11
33
27
17

1
6
3
4
6
13
5
2
6
6
9
14

2
7
6
5
3
10
12
7
18

10
2
6
4

3
1
1
4
4
14
11
14
16
29
51
77
31
62
50
60

105

152

75

74

22

428

1
1
2

* The data in this study have been carried only through 1937.

INDIX.NA LAW JOURNAL''

cl!

O

CO

w-

w

wC

[Vol. 24

I
LO

c!

1o

LI:

L9

C
Co

Co

Co

Co

Co

'"'

'

.

cqm

LI!

Co

Coi

Co

,-a

m

C m

o
E-4

co

Co

Co
t-

Co
Co

"1C C

<>
-0

04
Co

wO

''

Co
'r

Co

Co

Co

""

0.4

Co

0

Co

""

Co
Co

0q

.

0

cs.

0220
I
es

(D.
02

S..

8

&0

1949J

THE ADVISORY OPINION-AN ANALYSIS
0!
4O

10

00

0O

100I'

0~

00

E-f

k

0

~

M.

.0

0
rl000001

0

01

f

US
0

to
0

E4

0 c-400,-i1r,4

..

o 000,
CL

40

0

0

00i

0o

D

000010

022

,-4

m0

00

OSl

0

0

0
00

go i. 0

0
0
cod
00

t

m
0 00,b0
dk400

-ggS

0.O
c3Qz0
g;

0c
E-ON

a

C

0gf
r,

--

o-=tS-

00

f-oo~
M44n

Ot00

0.0

0

H000'100.0

sg
0-

0

0

226

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
LIST OF ADVISORY OPINIONS

Colorado
Colo. 620
622
623
623
624
625
626
628
629
630
631
631
632
635
639
641
642
373
186
187
188
285
287
289
290
337
339
340
359
395
399
466
316
421
520
578
593
595
598
600
601
602
539
192

(1886)

(1888)
(1888)

(1889)
(1889)
(1890)

(1891)
(1893)

18 Colo. 195 (1893)
18
220
18
234
18
272
18
273
18
288
18
291
18
317
18
359
18
398
18
566
19
58 (1893)
19
63 (1893)
19
333 (1894)
19
357
19
409
19
482
21
14 (1895)
21
27
21
29
21
32
21
38
21
46
21
62
21
69
21
399
21
403
23
492 (1897)
23
499
23
504
23
508
24
247 (1897)
24
446
25
136 (1899)
25
296 (1898)
26
140 (1899)
26
167
26
182
26
234
27
99 (1899)
28
359 (1901)
29
350 (1902)
33
307 (1905)
45
394 (1909)
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Colo. 331
569
101
215
528
587
591
342

50 Colo. 71 (1911)
50
84
166 (1913)
54
262
54
429
54
17 (1912)
55
105 (1913)
55
62
188 (1917)
319 (1919)
66

(1922)
(1931)
(1933)
(1934)
(1935)
(1935)
(1937)
(1937)

Maine
6 Maine
6
6
7
7
7
7
16

486
506
514
483
492
497
502
479

(1826)
(1830)
(1830)
(1830)
(1830)
(1831)
(1831)
(not given, but
approx. 1840)
(approx. 1842)
(approx. 1845)
(approx. 1851)
(1854)
(approx. 1855)
(approx. 1857)
(1861)
(1863)
(1863)
(1867)
(1867)
(1867)
(1870)
(1871)
(1872)
(1874)
(1871)
(1875)
(1876)
(1877)
(1878)
(1878)
(1878)
(1878)
(1879)
(1880)
(1880)
(1880)
(1881)

81 Maine 602
545
85
547
85
564
95
590
97
595
97
515
99
527
102
506
103
545
108
557
114
557
116
503
118
544
118
552
118
603
119
114 Atl. 865
123 Maine 593
453
124
501
124
512
124
529
125
50
137 Atl.
53
137
131 Maine 503
506
131
491
132
502
132
507
132
509
132
512
132
519
132
523
132
521
133
525
133
532
133
537
133
507
134

(1889)
(1891)
(1892)
(1901)
(1903)
(1903)
(1905)
(1907)
(1908)
(1911)
(approx. 1915)
(approx. 1917)
(approx. 1919)
(1919)
(1919)
(1921)
(1921)
(1923)
(1924)
(1925)
(1925)
(1926)
(1927)
(1927)
(1932)
(1932)
(1933)
(1933)
(1933)
(1933)
(1933)
(1933)
(1934)
(1935)
(1935)
(1935)
(1935)
(1935)
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3 Mass.
3
7
8
14
14
15
3 Pick.
7 Pick.
Mass.
11 Pick.
22 Pick.
23 Pick.
1Metc.
1 Metc.
5Metc.
5 Mete.
5 Metc.
3 Cush.
3 Cush.
6 Cush.
6 Cush.
6 Cush.
9 Cush.
11 Cush.
18 Cush.
3 Gray
8 Gray
10 Gray
13 Gray
14 Gray
1Allen
9 Allen
13 Allen
99 Mass.
107 Mass.
115
117
117
120
122
122
124
126
126
126
132
135
136
136

567 (1791)
568 (1807)
523 (1811)
548 (1812)
470 (1784)
472 (1787)
536 (1815)
517 (1826)
126n, 24
125 (1825)
537 (1832)
571 (1838)
547 (1840)
572 (1841)
580 (1841)
587 (1843)
591 (1844)
596 (1844)
584 (1840)
586 (1849)
573 (1833)
575 (1839)
578 (1851)
604 (1852)
604 (1853)
575 (1836)
601 (1855)
20 (1857)
613 (1858)
618 (1859)
614 (1859)
197n (1837)
585 (1864)
593 (1867)
636 (1868)
604 (1871)
602 (1874)
599 (1875)
603 (1875)
600 (1876)
594 (1877)
600 (1877)
596 (1878)
547 (1781)
557 (1878)
603 (1879)
600 (1882)
594 (1883)
578 (1883)
583 (1883)

Massachusetts
138 Mass.
142
145
148
150
150
150
154
155
157
160
163
165
166
167
175
178
182
186
190
190
190
193
195
196
201
204
204
207
207
208
208
208
208
208
208
208
209
210
211
211
211
211
211
211
211
214
214
216
217

601 (1885)
601 (1886)
587 (1887)
623 (1889)
586 (1890)
592 (1890)
598 (1890)
603 (1891)
598 (1892)
595 (1893)
586 (1894)
589 (1895)
599 (1896)
589 (1896)
599 (1897)
599 (1900)
605 (1901)
608 (1903)
603 (1904)
605 (1906)
611 (1906)
616 (1906)
608 (1907)
607 (1908)
603 (1908)
609 (1909)
607 (1910)
616 (1910)
601 (1911)
606 (1911)
603 (1911)
607 (1911)
610 (1911)
614 (1911)
616 (1911)
619 (1911)
625 (1911)
607 (1911)
609 (1912)
605 (1912)
608 (1912)
618 (1912)
620 (1912)
624 (1912)
630 (1912)
632 (1912)
599 (1913)
602 (1913)
605 (1914)
607 (1914)
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220 Mass. 609 (1915)
613 (1915)
220
627 (1915)
220
607 (1917)
226
613 (1917)
226
229
601 (1918)
603 (1919)
231
601 (1919)
232
605 (1919)
232
233
603 (1920)
597 (1920)
234
612 (1920)
234
237
589 (1921)
591 (1921)
237
598 (1921)
237
613 (1921)
237
619 (1921)
237
603 (1921)
239
606 (1921)
239
601 (1922)
240
611 (1922)
240
616 (1922)
240
605 (1923)
243
583 (1924)
247
589 (1924)
247
591 (1925)
250
569 (1925)
251

251 Mass. 617 (1925)
254
617 (1926)
261
523 (1927)
556 (1927)
261
603 (1928)
262
583 (1929)
266
590 (1929)
266
607 (1929)
267
611 (1929)
269
593 (1930)
270
575 (1930)
271
582 (1930)
271
598 (1930)
271
575 (1931)
275
275
580 (1931)
617 (1931)
276
607 (1932)
278
613 (1932)
278
607 (1932)
279
619 (1933)
282
611 (1934)
286
607 (1935)
289
601 (1935)
290
567 (1935)
291
572 (1935)
291
578 (1935)
291

New Hampshire
4 N. H. 565 (1827)
7
599 (1835)
8
573 (1835)
25
537 (1852)
35
579 (1858)
550 (1860)
41
41
553 (1861)
633 (1863)
44
590 (1864)
45
593 (1864)
45
45
595 (1864 approx. date)
607 (1864)
45
52
622 (1873)
634 (1866)
53
640 (1873)
53
570 (1875)
56
574 (1875).
56
58
621 (1877)
623 (1879)
58
60
585 (1881)

62 N. H. 704 (approx. 1816)
62
706 (1877)
62
706 (1883)
63
625 (1885)
65
673 (approx. 1889)
66
629 (1891)
67
600 (approx. 1892)
70
638 (1899)
70
640 (1901)
642 (1901)
70
71
621 (1902)
72
601 (1903)
72
605 (1903)
73
618 (1905)
621 (1906)
73
73
625 (1906)
606 (1907)
74
613 (1909)
75
622 (1910)
75
75
624 (1910)

230
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76 N. H. 596 (1911)
588 (1911)
76
597 (1911)
76
601 (1911)
76
609 (1913)
76
612 (1889)
76
606 (1914)
77
611 (1915)
77
617 (1917)
78
621 (1917)
78
535 (1919)
79
595 (1921)
80
552 (1923)
81
563 (1925)
81
566 (1925)
81
573 (1925)
81
561
82
589 (1927)
83
557 (1930)
84

84 N.H.
84
85
85
85
86
86
86
87
87
87
87
88
88
88
88
88
88

559
584
562
570
572
597
603
604
489
490
492
496
484
494
495
497
500
511

(1930)
(1930)
(1931)
(1931)
(1931)
(1933)
(1933)
(1934)
(1935)
(1935)
(1935)
(1935)
(1937)
(1937)
(1937)
(1937)
(1937)
(1937)

38 S.D.
43
43
43
48
48
50
58
59
61
61

635
635
645
648
253
375
324
72
469
107
162

(1917)
(1920)
(1920)
(1920)
(1925)
(1925)
(1926)
(1931)
(1932)
(1933)
(1933)

South Dakota
2 S.D.
2
3
3
4
6
6
7
8
10
34

58
71
456
548
532
518
540
42
274
249
650

(1891)
(1891)
(1893)
(1893)
(1894)
(1895)
(1895)
(1895)
(1896)
(1897)
(1914)
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